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ABSTRACT
e popularity of Android system, not only in the handset devices
but also in IoT devices, makes it a very aractive destination for
malware. Indeed, malware is expanding at a similar rate targeting
such devices that rely, in most cases, on Internet to work properly.
e state-of-the-art malware mitigation solutions mainly focus
on the detection of the actual malicious Android apps using dy-
namic and static analyses features to distinguish malicious apps
from benign ones. However, there is a small coverage for the In-
ternet/network dimension of the Android malicious apps. In this
paper, we present ToGather, an automatic investigation framework
that takes the Android malware samples, as input, and produces
a situation awareness about the malicious cyber infrastructure of
these samples families. ToGather leverages the state-of-the-art
graph theory techniques to generate an actionable and granular
intelligence to mitigate the threat imposed by the malicious Internet
activity of the Android malware apps. We experiment ToGather
on real malware samples from various Android families, and the
obtained results are interesting and very promising.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices are important gadgets in our lives. Nowadays, mo-
bile systems, especially Android, and their applications (apps) dom-
inate most of our daily economic and social interactions. Android
has the biggest share in the mobile computing industry [13] due to
its open-source distribution and sophistication. Besides, it became
not only the dominant platform for mobile phones and tablets, but
is also gaining increasing aention and penetration in the realm
of Internet of ings (IoT) [8, 9]. e ubiquitous nature and pop-
ularity of Android OS made it the rst target of malicious threats
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in mobile computing platforms [11]. Indeed, malware apps are not
only targeting conventional devices such as phones and tablets,
but also more critical systems such as home IoT devices. e laer
could allow the adversary to achieve more severe aacks, which
could inict physical damages [5] as the aacker could gain access
to physical system controllers of cars, air conditioning systems,
refrigerators, etc.
Mobile and IoT devices are more critical than personal computers
in many ways: (i) In contrast with personal computers, they are
equipped with sophisticated sensors, from cameras and microphone
to gyroscope and GPS. ese various sensors open a whole new
world of applications for end-users. However, they also unleash
unprecedented potential cyber-threats that could be commied by
adversaries who gain access to these resources through Android
malware apps. (ii) in devices (smart handsets and IoT devices)
have limited resources in terms of computation, energy power,
and network bandwidth compared to PCs. is makes extensive
security analyses very expensive, if not impossible in some cases, to
track maliciousness indicators whether dynamic or static in nature.
erefore, the adversary needs less sophisticated malicious apps
compared to PC ones to achieve the aack. (iii) A thin device
could inict more damage than a PC due to its high portability,
and hence could infect/damage a large number of networks (e.g.,
work, home, restaurant, airport). Indeed, infected thin devices
could play the role of a payload transporter to harm other systems
and networks. (iv) In terms of deployment, the number of thin
devices (including Android ones) is by far larger than the number
of PCs. erefore, an adversary that leverages malicious apps could
infect more IoT devices than PCs. e aacker could infect and
control (tens of) thousands of PCs and use them as her/his malicious
cyber-infrastructure. Nowadays, malicious cyber-infrastructures
could reach (tens of) millions of devices if we include devices in
TVs, smart watches, connected cars, etc. (v) Finally, the centralized
mechanism through which Android apps are distributed using App
repositories [12] allows for the distribution of malicious apps that
bypass veing systems and hence be available on a huge number
of end-user devices.
e aforementioned factors highlight the urgent need to de-
sign and implement new methodologies, techniques and tools to
mitigate cyber-threats against Android mobile and IoT devices, es-
pecially that we are witnessing a convergence between Android
and IoT devices. IoT devices could run Android OS or a lightweight
version of it. In this context, Google proposes Androiding [9], an
Android-based IoT operating system. On the other hand, Android
may animate other IoT devices that control systems such as smart
homes or smart buildings. To mitigate these cyber-threats [11],
we need to have an accurate situational awareness of the threat
landscape. e state-of-the-art Android security solutions mainly
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concentrate on: (i) Static analysis [22, 34, 44, 58], where the empha-
sis is on the actual Android malware le (Android Packaging APK):
Here, the community tends to ngerprint Android malware using
approximate ngerprints or learning models that leverage statisti-
cal features engineered from the static content. Static analysis is
not generally eective in the presence of obfuscation techniques.
(ii) Dynamic analysis [18, 28, 52, 60] based on the reports generated
aer executing the actual malware in a sandboxing system: e
security analysis leverages these reports to discover and ngerprint
malicious behaviours of Android malware samples. e dynamic
analysis tends to be more resilient against obfuscation. However, it
is more time consuming compared to static analysis. (iii) Hybrid ap-
proaches [23, 36, 55, 59] leverage both static and dynamic analyses
techniques to achieve a higher detection performance.
However, current Android malware solutions do not address the
network dimension of mobile and IoT security. Furthermore, a com-
mon important characteristic between IoT devices and smart hand-
sets is Internet access. erefore, having malicious apps could allow
the adversary to connect to infected devices at any time. Besides,
Internet access is far from being a suspicious permission in Android
veing system. More precisely, the gap resides in the lack of situa-
tional awareness about malicious cyber-infrastructures that relate
Android malware apps and their families. By cyber-infrastructure,
we mean all the domains and IP addresses, i.e., the network infor-
mation that is used by the adversary to control, download, upload,
or at least, collect sensitive information through malicious apps
that are already installed on infected Android devices (e.g. smart
handset and IoT devices). Solutions, such as [26] [48], address mali-
cious infrastructures in general focusing on malware samples and
their families but without a special emphasis on Android-based
platforms. In other words, there is a need for online solutions that
leverage the large number of detected Android malware samples
from dierent families. e laer should be the starting point of se-
curity solutions to achieve a situational awareness about malicious
cyber-infrastructures underlying daily Androidmalware at dierent
granularity levels. In other terms, the intention is to achieve a beer
understanding and focus on the malicious cyber-infrastructures
underlying one Android malware sample, one malware family of
samples, or several families at the same time.
In this respect, we propose ToGather, an automatic investiga-
tion framework for Android malware cyber infrastructures. To-
Gather framework is a set of techniques and tools together with
security feeds to automatically achieve a situational awareness
about Androidmalware. Actually, ToGather characterizes the cyber-
infrastructure of a given malware sample, a set of samples, family
or families as a multipartite graph that relates malware samples
and the corresponding network footprint in terms of IPs and do-
mains. ToGather goes even a step further by dividing this cyber-
infrastructure into sub-infrastructure components based on the
connectivity between the nodes. e result is in fact multiple net-
work communities representing many sub-cyber-infrastructures
that are related to the Android malware sample or family. To this
end, ToGather leverages the enormous amount of cyber-threat intel-
ligence that is derived from various sources such as spam, Windows
malware, darknet, and passive DNS to ascribe cyber-threats to the
corresponding cyber-infrastructure. Accordingly, the input of To-
Gather framework is made of malware samples, and the output
is networks of cyber-infrastructures together with their network
footprint, which would give the security practitioner an overview
of Android malware cyber-activities on the Internet.
e process of ToGather framework starts by taking, as input,
Android malware samples. First, we extract network information
from these malicious apps. For this purpose, we use a hybrid ap-
proach, where both static and dynamic analyses are applied on mal-
ware. e resulting network information (IPs and domain names) of
the malware sample represents the malicious nodes of its malicious
cyber-infrastructure. However, the network information could be
very noisy, as it might include several benign domain names of
well-known sites, and the same applies to IP addresses. Hence,
ToGather lters these entries through whitelisting in order to re-
move such IPs and domain names. Aerwards, ToGather correlates
the network footprint with a passive DNS database to enrich the
network information in two ways: (i) Get the IP addresses resolved
from the current domain names list. (ii) Get the domain names
that point to the collected IP addresses. e result is an enriched
network information that has more coverage in terms of malicious
cyber activity of the input malware samples. However, this infor-
mation could be richer if we structure it; hence, ToGather builds
from the network information a multi-partite graph connecting the
hashes of malware samples to the corresponding IP addresses and
domain names. e heterogeneous graph is used to derive abstract
homogenous graphs where the emphasis is put on the network in-
formation while abstracting away from the malware hashes (since
they have the same family in a typical use case). e homogeneous
graphs, namely threat networks, represent cyber-infrastructures of
Android malware. ToGather applies a highly scalable community
detection algorithm [24] on this threat network to extract sub-threat
networks with high connectivity aiming to give a more granular
view to the security practitioner. Besides, we apply page rank-
ing algorithm on these sub-cyber-infrastructures in order to rank
the nodes (information network) according to their importance
in terms of connectivity among sub-graphs. is indeed results
in actionable intelligence that could be leveraged for instance to
take-down operations. Finally, for each sub-threat network, we
correlate the resulting cyber-infrastructure with well-known ma-
licious information networks to label the underlying malicious
activities. ToGather framework automates the previous steps to
help security analysts achieve a great deal of situational awareness
on Android malware and its activities on the Internet. As such, our
contribution is essentially the framework as a whole and not only
the components.
e main contributions of this paper are:
(1). We design and implement ToGather, a simple, yet practical
framework to generate a granular situational awareness report on
the malicious cyber infrastructures underlying Android malware.
(2). We propose a correlation mechanism with multiple cyber-
threat intelligence feeds, which enrich, not only the resulting mali-
cious cyber-infrastructure intelligence, but also the labeling of the
tracked malicious activities.
(3). We evaluate ToGather framework on real Android mal-
ware samples from Drebin malware dataset. e evaluation shows
promising and interesting ndings.
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2 OVERVIEW
2.1 reat Model
Weposition ToGather as a detector ofmalicious cyber-infrastructures
of Android malware. It is designed to uncover threat networks
and the sub-networks from a seed of Android malware samples.
However, malware detection is described in existing proposals
[22, 28, 36, 44, 52, 59] and is out of the scope of this paper. To-
Gather does not guarantee zero false-positives due to the large
number of benign domain names and IP addresses that might not
be ltered out with ToGather whitelists. ToGather is very resilient
to obfuscation during the extraction of the network information
from Android malware because it applies both static and dynamic
analyses. Hence, if the static content is heavily obfuscated, To-
Gather is still able to collect IP addresses and domain names from
dynamic analysis reports.
2.2 Usage Scenarios
ToGather is designed to be practical and ecient in the hands of
security practitioners.
• Security analyst uses ToGather framework as an investi-
gation tool to minimize the eorts of generating threat
networks for a given Android malware family. e ana-
lyst leverages the IP addresses and domain names ordered
by their importance in the generated threat network to
prioritize the takedown and mitigation operations.
• ToGather acts as a monitoring system. It analyzes a mal-
ware feed of Android malware family (e.g., new samples
on a daily basis) to generate a snapshot for threat network
and uncover the malicious activities (spam, phishing, scan-
ning, and others). Periodic reporting gives insights into
the cyber evolution and the malicious behaviors of a given
malware family over time.
• ToGathermeasures the Android malware activity on top of
cloud vendors by reporting that a given Android malware
family is using a specic cloud vendor infrastructure for
its malicious activity during a period of time.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present the overall workow of ToGather frame-
work, as shown in Figure 1, starting from the Android malware
samples ending with the produced relevant security intelligence:
1) e rst step in ToGather framework consists of deriving
network information from Android samples in a given window
analysis (e.g., day, week, month) whether they are from the same
malware family or not. However, we consider one malware family
as a typical use-case of ToGather, as presented in the evaluation
section. ToGather conducts dynamic and static analyses where
each analysis produces a report for each Android malware sam-
ple. erefore, a given malware has two reports from dynamic
and static analyses. Leveraging both analysis types enhances the
resiliency of ToGather against common obfuscation techniques.
e laer aims to hide relevant information about malicious activi-
ties such as domain names and IP addresses (network information).
Aerwards, ToGather extracts network information strings from
the analysis reports. At this point, we apply a simple text paern
search to nd IP addresses and domain names. In static analysis,
we mainly concentrate on the Dalvik compiled code (classes.dex)
for the extraction. We collect network information more eciently
from dynamic analysis reports since they are more structured and
have labeled elds.
2) Next, we lter the extracted network identiers from noise
information such as non-routed IP addresses. Also, we lter domain
names and URLs that use Unicode characters. For the current
ToGather implementation, we do not consider domain names and
URLs wrien in other languages such as Japanese or Arabic. In the
case of URL links, we keep only domains. To this end, we have a set
of valid IP addresses and domain names found in Android malware.
It is important to notice here that each network information is
tagged by the underlying malware hash and this tag will be kept
during all the workow steps of ToGather. To minimize false
positives, ToGather applies whitelisting mechanisms. For domain
names, ToGather leverages the complete Alexa [3] andantcast
[15] (more than one million domain name). However, the number
of white domain names is a hyper-parameter in ToGather that we
could use to control the amount of false positives. In the case of IP
addresses, we leverage a set of public white IPs such as Google DNS
servers and other ones [16]. It is important to stress that ToGather
considers public cloud vendor IPs and domain names as a whitelist.
e aim is to observe and then gain insight into the use the cloud
infrastructure by Android malware. is idea originates from the
observation that Android malicious apps (and malware in general)
make more use of the cloud as a low-cost infrastructure for their
malicious activity.
3) In this step, we propose a mechanism to enhance and enrich
the malicious network information to cover related domains and IPs.
In essence, ToGather aims at answering the following questions: (i)
What are the IP addresses of current malicious domains? Here we
investigate the IP addresses of server machines that host malicious
activities. e laer are most likely related to the analyzed Android
malware. (ii) What are the domain names pointing to the current
malicious IP addresses? e intuition is that a malicious server
machine with a given IP address could host various malicious con-
tents and the adversary could use multiple domains pointing to
such contents. To answer this question, ToGather has a module
to enrich network information by using passive DNS replication.
e laer is a technology that builds zones replicate without the
cooperation from zone administrators, based on captured name
server responses, as presented in Section 6.1. We use the network
information, whether IP addresses or domains, as parameters to
two functions applied on a passive DNS database. e goal of the
function is to enrich the list of domains and IP addresses that could
be part of the adversary threat network. e enrichment services
are: (i) GetIP(Domain): is function takes a domain as a parameter
to query passive DNS database. e result is all IP addresses the
domain points to. (ii) GetDomain(IP): is function gets all the
domains that resolves to the IP address given as a parameter.
We consider passive DNS correlation for two reasons: (i) A small
number of Android malware samples generally yields limited net-
work information. (ii) Security practitioners aim at having a more
comprehensive situational awareness about malware Internet activ-
ity. As such, they would like to consider all related IPs and domain
names. e result of the correlation is a set of IP addresses and
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Figure 1: Approach Overview
domains enriched using passive DNS, related to Android malware
apps. e correlation results could, however, overwhelm the inves-
tigation process. Passive DNS correlation is therefore optional if
we have a big number of samples from a given Android family. To-
Gather applies network information enrichment using the passive
DNS replication. e correlation with passive DNS could produce
some known benign entries. For this reason, we lter the likely
harmless network information by matching the newly found ones
against top Alexa [3] andantcast [15] domain names and known
public IP addresses [4].
5) At this stage, we have a set of network information tagged
by malware hashes. To extract relevant and actionable intelligence,
ToGather aggregates all the previous records into a heterogeneous
network with dierent types of nodes: malware hashes, IP addresses
and domain names. We consider the heterogeneous network that is
extracted from a given Android malware family as the malicious
activity map of that family on the Internet. We call such a heteroge-
nous network, a threat network. Furthermore, ToGather produces
homogenous networks by executing multiple projections according
to the node type (IP address or domain name). For example, in the
IP projection, the projection of a malware hash connecting two
IP addresses would be only the two IPs connecting to each other.
erefore, ToGather produces three homogeneous graphs, one only
considers IP addresses connections, and the other only considers
domain names connections. Finally, we consider a threat network
with IPs and domains as one type network information. e goal of
homogenizing the connection network is to apply graph analyses
that need the graph homogeneity (i.e., IP threat network), domain
threat network, and network information threat network.
6) Further, ToGather aims at producing more granular graphs
(see Figure 2) from the generated threat networks derived in the
previous step. In this respect, ToGather checks the possibility of
community identication in these threat networks based on the
connectivity between nodes. e higher is the connectivity be-
tween the nodes in a particular area of the network, the more is the
possibility to have a malicious community in such area. For commu-
nity detection (Section 4), we adopt a highly scalable algorithm [24]
to enhance ToGather community detection module. e intuition
behind using the community concept is: (i) Considering ToGather
typical usage scenario, where we enter Android malicious apps
from the same family, the community could dene dierent threat
networks that are related to the malicious activities. In other words,
either one adversary is using these threat networks as backups
or we have instead multiple adversaries. In the case of Android
malware, the second hypothesis is more plausible because of the
cheap repackaging of existing malware samples to suit the need
of the perpetrator. (ii) In case ToGather receives Android malware
from dierent families, the communities could be interpreted as
the threat networks of dierent Android malware families to focus
on the relation between them. e output of this step is a set of
threat networks related to IPs, domains, and network information
and their communities (sub-threat networks).
7) To produce actionable cyber-threat intelligence, we leverage
Google page ranking algorithm (Section 5) to produce ranking
scores for critical nodes of a given (sub) threat network. Conse-
quently, the investigator would have some priority list when it
comes to mitigation or take down of nodes that are associated with
a malicious cyber-infrastructure. As a result, ToGather produces
each (sub) threat network of the Android malware family together
with the ranking of each node. Because ToGather generates mul-
tiple homogeneous graphs based on the node type (IP, domain,
network information), it produces dierent ranking lists based on
the node type. erefore, the security practitioner will have the op-
portunity of selecting the node type when executing the mitigation
or the take down to protect his system. In such case, an IP node
could be more suitable as it could be blacklisted for instance. Also, it
is important to mention that it is expensive for the adversary to get
new IP addresses. In contrast, domain names could be frequently
changed due to their aordability.
8) We do not focus only on Android malware. Instead, we aim
at gaining insights into the shared network IP and domains with
other platform malware families. Indeed, the adversary tends to
have many malicious weapons in several operating systems to
achieve the maximum coverage. erefore, similarly to the rst
step, we conduct dynamic and static analyses on Windows and
Linux malware samples to extract the corresponding network in-
formation. e same step is applied to this network information.
Aerwards, we correlate the Android network information with the
non-Android malware information to discover another dimension
of the adversary network. e result will be all the IP addresses
and the domains of Android malware in addition to all network
records of a given non-Android malware family if they share some
network information. It is important to notice that the information
networks of non-Android malware are also labeled by malware fam-
ilies. erefore, the result of this step is the previous (sub) threat
networks tagged by Android malware family in addition to tags
of other platform malware. So, the security analyst would have a
clearer view on the Android cross-platform malicious activity.
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9) In this nal step of ToGather workow, we leverage another
cyber-threat source, namely sub-threat networks, to label mali-
cious activities that are commied by the produced communities.
Specically, we leverage network information that is collected from
dierent security data. e current ToGather implementation in-
cludes the correlation with spam emails, reconnaissance traces and
phishing URLs. erefore, the investigator will not only have the
cyber-infrastructure of the Android malicious family but also if it
is part of other cyber malicious activities that are conducted by the
infrastructure.
We consider ToGather as an active service that receives at ev-
ery epoch time (day, week, month) Android malware with its cor-
responding family (the typical use case) and produces valuable
intelligence about this malware family.
4 THREAT COMMUNITIES DETECTION
A scalable community detection algorithm is essential to extract
communities from the threat network. For this reason, we empower
ToGather with the Fast Unfolding Community Detection algorithm
[24], which can scale to billions of network links. e algorithm
achieves excellent results by measuring the modularity of commu-
nities. e laer is a scalar value M ∈ [−1, 1] that measures the
density of edges inside a given community compared to the edges
between communities. e algorithm uses an approximation of
the modularity since nding the exact value is computationally
hard [24]. Our main reason to choose the algorithm proposed in
[24] is its scalability. As depicted in Figure 3, we apply the com-
munity detection on a million-node graph with a medium density
(P = 0.001 probability of node A is another node B), which we
believe has a similar density to the threat network generated from
Android malware samples. For the sake of completeness, we per-
form the same experiment on graphs with a dierent probability P .
As presented in Figure 4(c), we are able to detect communities in
30, 000-node graphs with ultra density (unrealistic) in a relatively
small (compared to the time dedicated to the investigation) amount
of time (3hours).
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Figure 3: Scalability of the Community Detection
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Figure 4: Graph Density Versus Scalability
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA ElMouatez Billah Karbab and Mourad Debbabi
e previous algorithm requires a homogeneous network, as
input, to work correctly. In our case, the threat network generated
from the network information is a heterogeneous network because
it contains two main node types: (i) e malware sample identier,
which is the cryptographic hash of the malware sample. (ii) e
network information: the domain names and the IPv4 addresses. In
the current implementation, we do not consider IPv6 addresses and
domain names in other languages. Also, we apply the projection on
the rst heterogeneous network to generate homogeneous graphs.
To do so, ToGathermakes the graph projection by abstracting away
from themalware identier and only takes the network information,
i.e., if the malware identier connects to two IPs, the projection
would produce only the two IPs connecting to each other. To
this end, we get dierent projection results based on the node
abstraction: (i) General threat network contains both IP addresses
and domain names. (ii) IP threat network contains only IP addresses.
(iii) Domains threat network contains only domain names.
Furthermore, ToGather could mine sub-threat networks that
have highly connected nodes compared to the rest of the cyber-
threat network. e intuition here is that each sub-threat network
could be a dierent malicious infrastructure that is used by an
adversary. e security practitioner could automatically segregate
possible cyber-infrastructures that could lead to dierent aacks
even if we use only one Android malware family. To achieve such
scenario, we apply the previous community detection algorithm on
the dierent threat network to check for possible sub-graphs. Also,
ToGather lters nodes (IPs, domains) with weak links to others
nodes, as we interpret them as false positives (leaves or parts of
tiny sub-graphs).
5 ACTIONS PRIORITIZATION
From the community detection, ToGather checks if there is possi-
ble sub-graphs in the threat networks based on node connectivity.
Even though the sub threat networks zoom into malicious cyber-
infrastructures of a given Android malware family, the security
practitioner could not mitigate against the whole threat network at
once. For this reason, ToGather proposes an action priority system.
e laer takes the IP, domain or both, and threat network and
produces an action priority list based the maliciousness of each
node. By leveraging the graph structure of the threat network, we
measure the maliciousness of a given node by its degree, meaning,
the number of edges that relate it to other nodes. From a security
point of view, the more connections an IP or domain has, the more
it is important for a malicious cyber-infrastructure. erefore, our
goal is to build a priority list sorted by the damage, an IP or a
domain, which can inict in terms of malicious activity. e im-
portance of nodes in a network graph is known as node’s centrality.
e laer represents a real-valued function produced to provide a
ranking, which identies the most relevant nodes ([25]). For this
purpose, some algorithms have been dened, such as Hypertext In-
duced Topic Search (HITS) algorithm ([46]) and Google’s PageRank
algorithm ([27]). In our approach, we adopt Google’s PageRank
algorithm due to its eciency, feasibility, less query time cost, and
less susceptibility to localized links ([49]). In the following, we
briey introduce the PageRank algorithm and the random surfer
model.
5.1 PageRank Algorithm
Denition 5.1. (PageRank). Let I (vi ) be the set of vertices that
link to a vertex vi and let deдout (vi ) be the out-degree centrality
of a vertex vi . e PageRank of a vertex vi , denoted by PR(vi ), is
provided in Eq. 1:
PR(vi ) = d

∑
vj ∈I (vi )
PR(vj )
deдout (vi )
 + (1 − d)
1
|D | (1)
e constant d is called damping factor, assumed to be set to
0.85 [27]. Eq. 1 produces one equation per node vi with an equal
number of unknown PR(vi ) values. e PageRank algorithm tries
to nd out iteratively dierent PageRank values, which sum up
to 1 (sumni=1PR(vi ) = 1). e authors of the PageRank algorithm
considers the use case of web surng, where the user starts from a
web page and randomly moves to another one through a web link.
If the web surfer is on pagevj with a probability or a damping factor
d , then the probability to change page vi is 1deдout (vj ) . e user
could follow the links and teleport to a random web page inV with
1−d probability. e described surng model is a stochastic process,
andW is a stochastic transition matrix, where node ranking values
are computed as presented in Eq. 2:
®PR = d
[
W . ®PR
]
+ (1 − d) 1|D | ®1 (2)
e stochastic matrixW is dened as follows:
wi j =
1
deдout (vj ) if a vertex vj is linked to vi
wi j = 0 otherwise
e notation ®R stands for a vector where its ith element is PR(vi )
(PageRank of vi ). e notation ®1 stands for a vector having all
elements equal to 1. e computation of PageRank values is done
iteratively by dening a convergence stopping criterion ϵ . At each
computation step t , a new vector ( ®PR, t) is generated based on
previous vector values ( ®PR, t − 1). e algorithm stops computing
values when the condition |( ®PR, t) − ( ®PR, t − 1)| < ϵ is satised.
6 SECURITY CORRELATION
6.1 Network Enrichment Using Passive DNS
Passive DNS [57] replication is the process of capturing live DNS
queries and/or their responses, and using this data to build partial
replicas of as many DNS zones as possible. Passive DNS aims to
make replication of the domain zones without the collaboration
of zone administrators. A DNS sensor is used to capture the inter-
server DNS communications. Aerwards, the records of passive
DNS are stored in a database where they can be queried. We can ben-
et from the passive DNS database in many ways. For instance, we
can know the history of a domain name as well as the IP addresses it
is/was pointing to. We can also nd what domain names are hosted
on a given name server or what domains are/(have been) pointing
to a given IP address. ere are a lot of use cases of passive DNS for
security purposes (e.g., mapping criminal cyber-infrastructure [21],
tracking spam campaigns, tracking malware command and control
systems, detection of fast-ux networks, security monitoring of a
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given cyber-infrastructure and botnet detection). In our context,
we correlated ToGather with a passive DNS database (30Billion
record) to enrich the investigation of Android malware by: (i) Find-
ing suspicious domains that are pointing to a malicious IP address
extracted from the analysis of a malware sample. (ii) Finding suspi-
cious IP addresses that are resolved from a malicious domain that
is extracted from the analysis of malware sample. (iii) Measuring
the maliciousness magnitude of an IP address: a server identied
by a malicious IP address that hosts many malicious activities. We
could measure the maliciousness by counting the number of do-
mains that resolve to this malicious IP address. Typically, these
domains could be related to dierent malicious activities or a single
one. (iv) Filtering outdated domain names: e passive DNS query
generally returns timestamp information. ToGather could leverage
the timestamps to lter out old domain names that are no longer
active.
PDNS Correlation
Three Samples
Figure 5: reat Network With&(out) Correlation
We consider passive DNS correlation as an optional component
in ToGather workow for two reasons. First, passive DNS could
be missing to reproduce ToGather framework, since the security
practitioner may not have access to such database. Second, the
corpus of Android malware samples is enormous, and there are new
feeds of malware samples every day. Hence, such large number
of samples could ll the gap of passive DNS correlation due to
the amount of the extracted network information. For example,
as presented in Figure 5, the threat network generated from three
malware samples could be enhanced by the correlation with passive
DNS.
6.2 reat Network Tagging
ToGather produces, from Android malware samples, a threat net-
work that summarizes their malicious activities. Aerwards, To-
Gather detects and produces threat sub-networks if any. Besides,
it helps prioritizing the actions to be taken to mitigate this threat
using the PageRank algorithm. In this section, we go a step further
towards the automatic investigation by leveraging other security
feeds. Specically, we aim at correlating threat networks with spam
intelligence, reconnaissance intelligence, etc. e objective is to
give a multi-dimensional view about the malicious activities that
are related to the investigated Android malware family. Moreover,
ToGather considers the correlation with network information from
other platform malware; in the current setup, we correlate with PC
malware from dierent operating systems.
PC Malware: e adversary tends to have dierent malware sam-
ples in their arsenals to achieve their goal. Besides, dierent types
of malware could be used to cover distinct platforms. e used
malware samples run on many platforms, but they might share
the elements of the same cyber-infrastructure run by the aacker.
erefore, nding other platform malware that share a similar
threat network with a given Android malware sample, could help
discovering other malware that is in the aackers’ cyber-arsenals.
Considering the previous case, ToGather tags every produced threat
network by leveraging a database of network information extracted
from PC malware VirusShare [17]. e malware database is con-
tinuously updated. e obtained information is identied by the
malware hash and its malware family. e laer helps identifying
PC malware (and their families) that share network information
with the Android threat network.
Spam: ToGather takes advantage of a spam database (30 Million
record) to report the relationship between spamming campaigns
and a given threat network. is information is precious for security
analysts who are tracking spam campaigns.
Phishing: Similarly to the spamming activity, we consider the
phishing activity in ToGather tagging. Phishing activities aim at
stealing sensitive information using fake web pages that are similar
to known trusted ones. Typically, the aacker spread phishing sites
using malicious URLs. We extract only the domain name and store
it in a phishing database (5 Million record).
Probing: Probing [50] is the activity of scanning networks over
the Internet. e aim is to nd vulnerable services. Probing is a
signicant concern in cyber-security because 50% of cyber-aacks
are preceded by network scanning activity [50]. For this reason,
ToGather considers tags of the threat network nodes if they are
part of a probing activity. is pre-supposes the availability of a
probing database (300 Million record) that contains IP addresses
that have been part of scanning activities within the same epoch.
Probing could be derived from darknet trac and the probing IP
addresses could be persisted in a probing database.
7 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the evaluation results of our proposed
system. e evaluation’s goal is to assess the eectiveness of To-
Gather framework on giving a situational awareness from a set of
Android malware samples. In our experimentation, we consider
two cases of the entered malware samples: (a) e samples belong
to the same Android malware family; here we look at the threat net-
work of the given family and its sub ones. (b) e samples belong to
dierent Android malware families; here we investigate the relation
between the various families of Drebin dataset and how the threat
network of the families could be distinguishable from other ones.
Notice that the network information will be hidden in the result due
the sensibility and condentiality of this information (i.e., domains
and IP addresses). Instead, we focus on the cyber-infrastructure of
the malware samples, i.e., how the sub-threat networks could be
apparent in the global threat network of Android malware family.
Finally, we show the tagging result of the resulting threat network.
7.1 Android Malawre Dataset
In the evaluation, we use a real Android malware dataset from
Drebin [22], a known dataset that contains samples labeled with
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their families. Drebin dataset [1] contains 5560 labeled malware
samples from 179 families [1]., as shown in Table 1.
It is important to stress that Drebin contains all the samples of
Genome dataset [2]. As a ground truth for the malware labeling,
we take the label provided by Drebin since there are some dier-
ences between Genome and Drebin dataset labeling. For example,
Genome recognizes dierent versions of DroidKungFu malware (1,
2 and 4), where Drebin has only DroidKungFu.
Malawre Family Number of Samples
0 FakeInstaller 925
1 DroidKungFu 667
2 Plankton 625
3 Opfake 613
4 GinMaster 339
5 BaseBridge 330
6 Iconosys 152
7 Kmin 147
Table 1: Dataset Description By Malware Family
7.2 Implementation
We have implemented ToGather using Python programming lan-
guage. In the static analysis, to perform reverse engineering of the
Dex byte-code, we use dexdump, a tool provided with Android SDK.
We extract the network information from the Dex dis-assembly
using regular expressions. Beside, ToGather extracts network infor-
mation from static text content in the APK le of Android malware.
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Figure 6: Sandboxing with Multi-Instance System
In the dynamic analysis, a cornerstone in ToGather framework is
the sandboxing system, which heavily inuences the produced anal-
ysis reports. We use DroidBox [10], a well-established sandboxing
environment based on the Android soware emulator [6] provided
by Google Android SDK [7]. Running the app may not lead to a suf-
cient coverage of the executed app. As such, to simulate the user
interaction with the apps, we leverage MonkeyRunner [14], which
produces random UI actions aiming for a broader execution cov-
erage. However, this makes the app execution non-deterministic
since MonkeyRunner generates random actions. erefore, this
yields dierent analysis reports for every execution, where the
accuracy of the results may vary. To tackle this issue, we run the
app in a sandboxing environment for a long time T to assure the
maximum of information in the resulting report. On the other hand,
a long time T could lead to execution boleneck since DroidBox
can only handle one app at a time. In this context, executing the
dataset apps in a sandboxing environment is a computation bot-
tleneck in ToGather. To overcome this challenge, we develop a
multi-worker sandboxing environment to exploit the maximum
available resources and boost the sandboxing task. as depicted in
Figure 6. Finally, since the generated reports are semi-structured
(JSON les), we straightforwardly extract the network information
from the specic elds.
7.3 Drebin reat Network
In this section, we present the results of applying ToGather frame-
work on the samples of Drebin dataset with all the 179 families.
Figure 7 depicts the threat network information (domain names and
IP addresses) of Drebin dataset, where each family is represented
by a dierent color. Although the threat network is noisy, we could
visually distinguish some connected communities with the same
nodes’ color, i.e., the same malware family. is initial observation
enhances the need for the community detection module in the To-
Gather framework. e community here is a set of graph nodes that
are highly connected even though they share some links with exter-
nal nodes. In Figure 8, we consider only the domain names; here we
could distinguish more sub threat networks having nodes from the
same malware family. We choose to lter all the IP addresses for
Drebin dataset due to our observation during the experimentation
process: (i) Some malware samples contain a signicant malware
number of IP addresses; exceeding, in some cases, 100 IPs such as
Plankton sample with MD5 hash 3f69836f64f956a5c00aa97bf1e04bf2. e
adversary could aim to deceive the investigator by overwhelming
the app with fake IP addresses along with used ones; this issue
will be discussed in Section 9. (ii) A big portion of the IP addresses
are part of cloud companies infrastructure; we lter most of the
public ones, but there are plenty of less known infrastructures in
other countries. (iii) In most cases, the adversary utilizes domains
for the malicious activity due to the low cost and the exibility
compared to IP addresses. In this experimentation, we consider
only the domain names, but the security analyst could include the
IP addresse when needed.
Using all Drebin dataset (179 malware families) to produce the
reat Network is an extream use case for ToGather framework;
few malware families is a typical use case when we aim to investi-
gate the threat networks relations. However, even with all Drebin
dataset, ToGather, as presented in Figure 8, shows promising re-
sults, where we could see many sub-threat networks with(out) links
to other nodes. By considering only domain names in Figure 8, it is
noticeable that the size of the threat network signicantly decreases
by removing the IP addresses; normally there are signicantly more
domains than IP addresses in the Android apps. However, this is
due to the extream whitelisting of domains compared to IPs (more
than 1 million domain) and the size of Drebin dataset. At this stage,
we do not present the community detection and page ranking on
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Figure 7: Network Information Drebin Dataset
the threat network; this will be conducted on a one-family use case
in the next section.
Figure 8: Domain Names Drebin Dataset
ToGather leverages dierent malicious datasets, as previously
described in Section 6.2, to tag the nodes of the produced threat
network. Figure 2 depicts the diverse malicious activities of the
nodes from Drebin threat network. First, the table shows the top
PC malware families which have shared network information with
the Drebin threat network. For families’ names, we adopt the
Kaspersky malware naming as our ground truth. Besides, Figure 2
shows the percentage of each malicious type in the Drebin threat
network. e result shows that 56% of the shared nodes have a
spamming activity, 40% are related to PC malware, 3% Scanning,
and 1% Phishing activities. Notice that the previous percentages
are only from the shared nodes and not from all the threat network.
Also, as we will discuss in Section 9, these results are not exhaustive
because of the correlation datasets that obviously do not contain
every malicious activity. We could extend the current correlation
datasets to cover more suspicious activities in future work.
PC	
Families
40%
Scan
3%
Spam
56%
Phishing
1%
PC	Families Scan Spam Phishing
# Family Hits
1 Agent a 1268
2 VBNA 283
3 Adload 152
4 EgroupDial 121
5 TrustAsia 120
6 Vobfus 88
7 KuPlays 74
8 Pipibo 72
9 Sality 62
aKaspersky Naming
Table 2: Drebin Dataset Tagging Results
7.4 Family reat Networks
In this section, we present the results of ToGather in its typical
usage scenario where malware samples from the same family are
analyzed. Figure 9 shows the steps of generating the threat net-
works from the DroidKungFu family sample. First, ToGather pro-
duces the threat network including network information collected
from the DroidKungFu analysis and Passive DNS correlation, as
shown in Figure 9(a). Aerward, ToGather lters the whitelist
network information. e results, as in Figure 9(b), depict bright
separated sub-threat networks without applying the community
detection algorithm. is could be an insightful result for the secu-
rity practitioner, especially that this sub-threat network contains
network information exclusively from some samples. ToGather
goes a step ahead by applying both community detection (Resolu-
tion hyperparameter r = 3) and page ranking algorithms (damping
factor d = 0, 85 and stopping criterion ϵ = 0.001 hyperparameters)
to divide the network and rank the importance of the nodes re-
spectively. e result is multiple sub-threat networks, with high
interconnection and low intra-connection, representing the cyber-
infrastructures of DroidKungFu malware family.
Figure 10 shows ToGather results using Android malware sam-
ples from BaseBridge family. Similarly, aer the ltering operation,
we could easily distinguish small sub-threat networks. In same
cases, the community detection task could be optional due to the
clear separation between the sub-threat networks. For instance,
Figure 11 depicts the threat networks for GinMaster, Adrd, and
Plankton Android malware families before and aer the community
detection task. Here, Adrd family clearly has multiple sub-threat
networks without the need of the community detection function
since it does not aect much the results. In the case of Plankton, it
is necessary to detect and extract the sub-threat network.
Tables 3 and 4 show the top PC malware families and samples
that share the network information with BaseBredge and Droid-
KungFu threat networks. An important factor in the correlation
is the explainability, where we could determine which network
information is shared between the Android malware and the PC
malware. is could help the security investigator to track the other
dimension of the adversary cyber-infrastructure.
In addition to the PCmalware tagging, we correlate with other cy-
ber malicious activity datasets over the Internet. Figure 12 presents
the malicious activities of DroidKungFu and BaseBridge families
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(a) Unltered (b) Filtered
(c) Divide (d) Ranking
Figure 9: DroidKungFu Malware reat Network
(a) Unltered (b) Filter&Divide (c) Ranking
Figure 10: Basebrigde Malware reat Network
# Sample Hits
1 ed7621ec4d a 2
2 e3bc76d14c 2
3 503902c503 1
4 bd9b87869b 1
5 8e0cf0a1ba6 1
6 f8a5cac12dc 1
7 14db95e5f6 1
8 9b5b576ef3 1
9 2ec2abc28d 1
aMD5 Hash First 10 Chars
# Family Hits
1 Agent a 23
2 Vobfus 21
3 EgroupDial 13
4 Badur 9
5 LMN 7
6 WBNA 4
7 Pipibo 2
8 Blocker 2
9 Virut 2
aKaspersky Naming
Table 3: Top PC Malware Related To BaseBridge Family
that are related to their threat network. Here, we found that both
families could be part of a spam campaign and have some scanning
activity. Notice that these results represent a fraction of the actual
activity because of the limited datasets. However, the previous
(a) Ginmaster (1) (b) Adrd (1) (c) Plankton (1)
(d) Ginmaster (2) (e) Adrd (2) (f) Plankton (2)
Figure 11: Android Families From Drebin Dataset
fraction could be a good indicator for the security practitioner in
the investigation process.
# Sample Hits
1 74529155cc a 3
2 bd5a9f768cf 2
3 259a244ab1 2
4 52da75225 1
5 11786afada 1
6 ad5e6d577b 1
7 9f4215bfc3 1
8 3c7667d0 1
9 117f21550 1
aMD5 Hash First 10 Chars
# Family Hits
1 Agent a 33
2 Adload 24
3 TrustAsia 13
4 KuPlays 11
5 Pipibo 8
6 FangPlay 5
7 StartPage 4
8 Injector 4
9 Turbobit 4
aKaspersky Naming
Table 4: Top PC Malware Related To DroidKungFu Family
PC	
Families
82%
Scan
1%
Spam
17%
PC	Families Scan Spam
(a) BaseBridge
PC	
Families
78%
Scan
1%
Spam
21%
PC	Families Scan Spam
(b) DroidKungFu
Figure 12: Maliciousness Tagging Per Family
8 DISCUSSION
e results in the previous section show promising insights about
the underlying cyber-infrastructures of the Android malware fam-
ilies. e produced threat networks could show one side of the
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adversary infrastructure, which is the Android malware one; this
side could lead to the complete threat network. Furthermore, all
the previous results could be extracted automatically and period-
ically from a feed of Android malware samples belonging to one
or various families. is requires xing the hyperparameter re-
lated to the used algorithms, the community detection and the page
ranking algorithms, as we did in our experimentation. Moreover,
the number of the malware samples and their families could be a
major hyperparameter that impacts the produced result. ToGather
framework could tolerate having dierent Android malware fam-
ilies as presented previously, where we consider all the families
of Drebin dataset (179 Families). Another important parameter is
the whitelisting hyperparameter, which contains the number of
domains from the top Alexa & antcast lists. e laer could
aect the result by introducing a lot of false positive domains. In
our case, we consider the complete lists, which leads to very few
false positives. However, this could introduce false negatives by
removing a site that is malicious.
e concept of sub-threat network gives an insight on the possi-
bility of having dierent threat networks, meaning multiple adver-
saries are reusing a family sample or one adversary uses distinct
threat networks. Moreover, the sub-threat network helps the se-
curity analyst to tackle the cyber-threat sequentially, by focusing
on one sub-threat network. Finally, passive DNS database has a
paramount role in discovering the related domains and IPs without
having all the samples of the malware family. erefore, with a rel-
atively small set of samples, we could discover the threat network
of the family. Finally, in the current implementation, we consider
only the PC malware, spamming, phishing, and scanning, but the
tagging could be extended to other security feeds.
9 LIMITATION AND FUTUREWORK
ToGather results depend mainly on the input malware samples,
which could aect the result in two ways. First, the adversary
could include noisy network information in the actual Android
package, thus overwhelming the process of detecting the threat
network. In the current ToGather setup, we consider both static
and dynamic analyses to detect the network information. Aer-
ward, we merge the result of each analysis to correlate with passive
DNS and generate the threat network. is setup is venerable to
such noise aack, but this could be mitigated by simply considering
the intersection instead of the union of the network information
analysis. Since the dynamic analysis result is more credible than the
static one, the intersection of both analyses is much more credible.
Also, the ltering operation could help mitigating such problem
by removing possible noise that is part of the white list. To this
end, ToGather adopts only static whitelisting, and we are planning
to build a dynamic ltering system based on reputation similar to
Notos [21]. Second, the Android malware family may rely on other
means to connect the threat network by not using direct IPs or do-
mains connection. Instead, the adversary could leverage legitimate
services such as Twier accounts to operate the malicious cyber-
infrastructure. In this case, ToGather could not detect such threats
since it relies mainly on network information. We consider such
problem as future work, where we investigate dierent network
information, including Twier and IRC communication. Finally,
ToGather’s current design produces a static threat network and
sub-network; the time dimension is not provided. A workaround
for this issue is to analyze the same malware family for dierent
timestamps and keep the result of each timestamp. e laer could
help in the study of the threat network over time. We plan to tackle
this issue more rigorously in future work.
10 RELATEDWORK
Previous works on Android malware mainly concentrate the actual
malware sample using two basic approaches: static and dynamic
analyses. Static analysis-based approaches [22, 34, 41–44, 51, 58, 61]
rely on static features extracted from the app, such as requested
permissions and APIs, to detect malicious apps. ese methods are
not resistant to obfuscation. On the other hand, dynamic analysis-
based approaches [18, 20, 28, 38, 40, 52, 56, 56, 60] aim to iden-
tify a behavioral signature or anomaly of the running app. ese
methods are more resistant to obfuscation than the static ones as
there are many ways to hide the malicious code, while it is di-
cult to hide the malicious behavior. e hybrid analysis methods
[23, 36, 55, 59]combine between static and dynamic analyses. A
signicant number of papers has been recently proposed to detect
repackaged apps by performing similarity analysis. e laer either
identies the apps that use the same malicious code (i.e., detection
of malware families) [19, 32, 33, 35, 39, 45, 47, 53, 64], or those that
repackage the same original app (i.e., code reuse detection) [29–
31, 37, 54, 62, 63]. However, most of them consider only malware
sample detection and not the network dimension of the Android
malware samples and their families. Dierently, our work is novel
in the sense that it represents the Android malware family by the
underlying malicious cyber-infrastructure (i.e., threat network).
e most similar work to our proposal is [26] [48], which studies
the malicious threat networks in general. Our work is dierent
from [26] [48] by considering the Android malware sample as the
seed to build the threat network. However, [26] [48] deal with vari-
ous sources as seeds. Besides, we propose ToGather as an online
system to continuously generate the threat network of Android
malware families in each epoch.
11 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented ToGather framework, a set of tech-
niques, tools and mechanisms and security feeds bundled to au-
tomatically build a situational awareness about a given Android
malware. ToGather leverages the stat-of-art of graph theory and
multiple security feeds to produce insightful, granular, as well as
actionable intelligence about malicious cyber-infrastructures re-
lated to the Android malware samples. We experiment ToGather
on real malware from Drebin Dataset[22].
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